Defining the nature of Sartre's 'freedom'. (Entry 2 by Oliver)

I would first like to correct Andres by pointing out that Helen made the post concerning her thoughts on idleness, not myself. I unfortunately didn't atend that lecture and as such feel at this time insufficienly qualified to comment on that subject on this blog. I am currently researching philosophy on idleness, as that seems to be the topic that the status quo has voted for the presentation, but I haven't yet ascertained a solid opinion concerning the issue.

In tackling the main reason for this blog, a response to both Andres and Helen's posts thus far concerning the nature of idleness, I feel obliged to offer my understanding of what Sartre truly meant concerning freedom. Of the Sartre I have read, most notably Existentialsim and Humanism and Being and Nothingness, I understand that far from championing the nature of human freedom, Sartre was at times also condemning of its essential prescence in our lives. His intention, in my view, was to convince us that, in any given moment, in any given situation, we are CONDEMNED to choose. This sentiment is expressed fully in his most famous of quotes - "Man is condemened to be free". To highight an example: Even if a man is detained in a cell, against his own will, shackled at every limb and unable to even move a muscle, HE IS STILL FREE... Free (admittedly in this instance most probably in the condemnatory sense) to rationally deliberate his situation. For instance, he is free to be angry or free to be accepting of his situation, as dire as it may be. A usefull reference similar to this examlple is The Diving Bell and the Butterfly by Jean-Dominique Bauby. To draw this point to a close, I find it imperative that we take great care to never shirk the responsibilty of autonomy by freedom that is condemned upon us by nature of our existence as rationally deliberating beings.

I disagree with Sartre's philosophy on a number of points, but likewise I have to admit agreement on this issue. Even in the direst of situations, man IS CONDEMNED to be free. This freedom, or furthermore CONDEMNATION, to rationally deliberate and conceptualize is our defining characteristic as a species. It sets us apart from the animal kingdom in an unmistakeable way. I must say, however, that I agree steadfastly with most of Andres ponts in his post. I passionately believe, not only in the instance of pregnant addicts but in many fields of inquiry, that it is of imperitive concern to treat the situation and the people it involves on a subjective basis. This stance may seem ideological to its critics (and in admission it most probably could be criticised as so) but I believe there is nothing wrong with striving towards an ideology and seing how far it takes us. As such, I think that this probably qualifies my stance concerning the treatment of addicts, when using Iris Marion Young's filter, as in favour of the 'empowerment' approach.

I doubt that my hitherto investigation into Sartre's notion of freedom will shed fresh light on the issue of where to place the blame concerning the issue of pregnant addicts. Indeed, I wonder whether we should be even trying to appropriate blame at all? My intention here was simply to examine what Sartre truly determined to explain to us concerning his notion of freedom and how we shoud use it. We are free, by nature of our existence as rationally deliberating and conceptualizing beings, to choose our path of action within the constraints of our subjective situation at any given time - and we are condemned to be responsible for this freedom by the very nature of our being.